CRISIL Ratings’ criteria for the power sector
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Executive summary

Electricity is a concurrent subject under the Constitution of India, which means the sector has oversight of both the central and state governments. Since Independence, the ‘power’ sector has been dominated by integrated utilities, which operate at the state level and carry out functions of generation, transmission and distribution of power within their geographical area. Centrally owned power generating utilities contribute significantly to power distributed at the national level through sales to various integrated state power utilities. After the introduction of competitive bidding, participation by the private sector has increased considerably.

This document discusses the criteria for rating players across the value chain of the power sector, including generation, transmission and distribution. The document also discusses the criteria for rating solar and wind power projects.

Generation and distribution

In generation and distribution, the key parameters considered for analysing business risk profile are: policy environment, regulatory risk, market position, service area economics, operating efficiency and project implementation. Policy and regulatory risk includes reform legislations, timeliness and accuracy of tariff determination, and treatment of regulatory assets. Market position covers revenue visibility through power purchase contracts, market share, customer profile, demand pattern, and level of competition in the industry and project implementation risks. Analysis of service area economics and operating efficiency involves cost position and tie-ups. Assessment of project implementation focusses on risks related to funding and setting up projects, and securing offtake post commissioning.

For assessment of financial risk, leverage, adequacy of future cash flows to meet financial obligations after covering operational expenses, and liquidity maintained in the form of debt service reserve account (DSRA) are the key parameters. Payment track record and management of receivables and payables are also considered. The assessment also factors in any material changes in the business environment, including the regulatory stance, changing market conditions, differential growth rates of various customer segments, tariff levels for various segments and growth orientation. Flexibility in raising funds from conventional and alternative sources to meet financial obligations and working capital / growth requirements is also evaluated.

Transmission

In transmission, the key parameters for analysing business risk profile are track record of line availability, operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, replacement of fixed assets and contingency plan, and counterparty payment delay risk.

For financial risk assessment of transmission companies, CRISIL Ratings primarily analyses the adequacy of future cash flows to meet financial obligations after covering operational expenses and maintaining liquidity in the form of DSRA.

Wind and solar projects

For rating wind and solar power projects, CRISIL Ratings evaluates project, management and operational risks. Specific factors such as technology risk and panel quality in solar projects are also considered. With respect to operational projects, PLF track record, counterparty payment track record, adequacy of cash flows to meet debt obligations and liquidity maintained in the form of DSRA are the key rating drivers.

For management risk assessment, CRISIL Ratings follows the standard criteria used for all manufacturing companies, which includes evaluating management philosophies, strategies/policies and risk appetite. This is available in detail in the CRISIL Ratings publication, ‘Rating criteria for manufacturing and services sector companies’.
Scope

This document covers the criteria for rating companies operating across the value chain of the power sector. They include:

- Power generation
- Power distribution
- Power transmission

The document also covers the criteria for rating renewable power projects including:

- Solar power projects
- Wind power projects
Rating criteria for power generation utilities

Background
Apart from business, financial and management risks, CRISIL Ratings evaluates risks specific to power generation such as industry risk and regulatory risk.

Business risk

Industry and policy environment
The domestic power generation sector had significant demand-supply deficit in the past. Capacity additions, resulting in power supply outpacing demand growth, have helped narrow the deficit in recent times. Demand has risen at a subdued pace in the past few years, owing to a slowdown in economic growth.

Traditionally, power generation has been largely by integrated utilities, state electricity boards (SEBs) and central government-owned utilities. With the advent of reforms, most SEBs have been unbundled along functional lines, with separate generation companies (gencos) at the state level. The share of the private sector in energy generation has increased rapidly over the years due to significant capacity additions. Also, there has been a shift from a single buyer to multiple buyers as gencos can now sell power to discoms in their geographical area as well as to private customers.

As per the Electricity Act, 2003, tariff for generation projects is based on a competitive bid scenario (with some exceptions), and not on a cost-plus formula as in the past. Cost of generation therefore is the key differentiator between gencos. Hence, CRISIL Ratings will continue to view low-cost producers positively.

Viability of the generation sector is closely linked to development of the transmission network, which evacuates power from the plant to load centres, and development of a distribution network that can absorb additional power. Poor transmission and distribution networks in the gencos' areas of delivery are viewed negatively by CRISIL Ratings. Financial viability of gencos is intricately linked to the financial position of the distribution sector, which is the primary offtaker. Most distribution utilities in India are state-owned and experience significant financial losses because of their poor operational profile. CRISIL Ratings considers this as a significant constraint for the ratings of gencos. Pricing and availability of fuel are also major constraining factors in the development of the generation sector.

Regulatory risk
The power sector in India comes under the purview of the central and state regulatory agencies, and functions are distributed between multiple implementing agencies. The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) and state electricity regulatory commissions (SERCs) are the chief regulators.

The Ministry of Power works in close coordination with CERC and CEA. While CERC acts more like a regulator responsible for approving tariffs of central utilities and licenses, CEA is a technical advisor, focused on planning (estimating power demand and generation and transmission capacity addition). CEA also reviews the performance of the power sector every month.

1 Updated: February 2021: For accessing the previous published criteria, please refer to https://www.crisil.com/content/dam/crisil/criteria_methodology/utilities/archive/CRISIL-Ratings-criteria-power-gen-utils_feb2018.pdf
CERC regulates the tariff of gencos owned or controlled by the central government as well as inter-state transmission of energy, including tariff of transmission utilities. It also grants licences for inter-state transmission and trading, and advises the central government in formulation of the National Electricity Policy and Tariff Policy.

SERCs determine the tariffs for generation, supply, transmission and wheeling of electricity, regulate the wholesale, bulk or retail sale of power within the state, and are responsible for issuing licenses for intra-state transmission, distribution and trading, and promoting co-generation and generation of electricity from renewable sources.

The Electricity Act 2003 and the National Tariff policy under the Act emphasise the implementation of competitive bidding for encouraging private sector investments in power generation, to reduce capital cost, promote efficiency in operations, and enable competitive pricing of electricity. The central and state governments have initiated various projects under the competitive bidding guidelines, typically called Case 1/ Case 2 bidding. Since January 2011, competitive bidding has become mandatory for all power generation projects.

Hence, progressively, the cost-plus tariff formulation will be replaced with projects based on competitive tariff bids, which will improve the ability of gencos to manage cost under pressure. For competitive bid projects, operational efficiency resulting in competitive tariff will be critical for minimising regulatory risks arising from non-allowance of certain expenses.

Tariff for direct sale to consumers, on the other hand, does not require regulatory approval and can be based on mutually agreed upon terms. However, regulatory intervention, in terms of wheeling charges to be paid to transmission companies and charges related to 'open access' to be paid to discoms for migration of high paying industrial customers, will continue. If regulators keep such expenses very high, it will dent the gencos' competitiveness to supply power to direct customers. Low open access charges are viewed favorably by CRISIL Ratings as they enhance the ability of gencos to access customers of high creditworthiness.

### Market and service area

With long-term, cost-plus-based power purchase agreements, recovery of fixed costs is ensured, including return on equity. However, this is subject to the plant being run efficiently and achieving the normative parameters set for fixed cost recovery. With competitive bidding, the tariff charged will become the single most important determinant of a generator's ability to capture the market, subject to availability of an adequate transmission network for evacuation of power from the generating plant to load centres.

Power has certain unique features: for instance, it cannot be stored. However, trading, as with any other commodity, is progressively expected to increase. Here too, the generator's capability to manage a competitive tariff would play a key role. The type of technology used, track record of the EPC contractor in setting up similar plants and of the plant operator, type of fuel used, and arrangements made for long-term procurement of fuel at competitive prices are important factors analysed by CRISIL Ratings. These factors have a significant impact on gencos' ability to deliver power consistently and competitively. Fuel prices and procurement practices, in particular, are the biggest risk factors, as fuel prices generally constitute the largest cost component for power plants. Plants with long-term arrangements, such as captive coal mining, will exhibit much lower fuel related risks, than those run on liquid fuel, which may be exposed to high fuel price volatility.

Given the poor credit profile of key offtakers (state-owned discoms), counterparty risk is another key factor that CRISIL Ratings looks into. Having a portfolio of offtakers, selling only to buyers with healthy credit profiles, or special payment security mechanisms are critical for minimising counterparty risks. As power cost comprises the single most important component in the expenditure of discoms, lower the tariff, better would be the ability of discoms to recover the entire amount from customers, and repay generators.
Operating efficiency

Only an efficiently run power generation plant can ensure consistent delivery of power at low rates. The key operational parameters that shape the operational profile of a plant include:

1. **The technology used**: A well-tested technology lowers probability of unplanned breakdowns

2. **Plant availability**: High plant availability is not only dependent on the technology used, but also on processes adopted for regular maintenance, and adequate fuel supply. Higher availability increases generating capability, and in a two-part tariff system, improves the actual recovery of fixed cost.

3. **Plant efficiency**: Low auxiliary consumption, plant heat rates and specific primary and secondary fuel consumption norms ensure that lesser quantity of fuel is used, thus reducing variable cost.

4. **Administrative efficiency**: Apart from fuel related expenses, minimisation of other expenses such as employee cost, interest and finance charges, is also necessary to keep the generation cost low. Both plant and administrative efficiency parameters should be benchmarked against those of other generators to analyse the relative efficiency.

5. **Environmental issues**: The type of fuel, location of plant and technology used can dictate the cost incurred over environmental issues at the construction and operational stages. In fact, in extreme cases, non-compliance with environmental norms can put continuance of operations at risk.

6. **Fuel price and availability**: Each distribution utility is mandated by the regulator to procure power based on a merit order dispatch, with the least priority set for the plant with the highest variable cost. Low fuel cost ensures high priority in the merit order system for the plant. Though, in a two-part tariff system, a distribution utility would have to pay a fixed cost if the plant is available for generation; lower the actual generation, higher will be the per unit cost for the utility, thus making it non-competitive to sell.

7. **Billing and collection**: A build-up of receivables would exert pressure on the cash flow of the generator. Credit profiles of offtakers, adherence to power purchase agreement, incentives/dis-incentives, and the average generation tariff in relation to average revenue raised by the discom affect receivables for generators.

Project implementation

The size of new projects being taken up, relative to the present scale of operations, is a key indicator of the direction the company is moving in. New projects generally entail higher risks than operational projects. Gestation period for a thermal plant is 3-4 years, while that of a hydel plant is longer, due to delays caused by political and regulatory disruptions. The focus is to determine the risks faced by the company in completing the projects. CRISIL Ratings studies the company’s pattern of financing approved and ongoing projects, and whether financing has been tied up. The financing mix, in terms of market debt and internal accrual/government support, is indicative of the company's financial policy. CRISIL Ratings conducts sensitivities on time and cost overruns to assess ability to service debt. Projects nearing completion are viewed more favourably than greenfield projects because they entail lower construction risk. CRISIL Ratings also gives due weightage to the company's track record in setting up projects. Power offtake and fuel procurement agreements are the critical documents analysed, as they represent the covenants responsible for the commercial viability of the generation plan during the operational stage.
Rating criteria for power distribution utilities

Background

Power distribution licensees service customers in a geographically demarcated area. Typically, a distribution licensee purchases power in bulk from a transmission licensee and supplies to a largely retail customer base within its service area. Traditionally, a number of power distribution licensees have been state-owned, while some urban centers do have privately owned entities.

CRISIL Ratings analyses business, financial and management risks alongside specific risks pertaining to utilities such as industry risk and regulatory risk while assessing the credit profiles of power distribution entities.

Industry risk

The industry risk assessment focuses on the demand-supply scenario and the policy environment. A distribution licensee's ability to provide quality power at a competitive rate is a critical rating determinant. At an industry level, this would eventually shift the balance towards better-performing distribution licensees which generate a higher quantum of cash from operations and are better placed to meet their obligations to generation and transmission licensees.

Regulatory risk

Distribution licensees are regulated by SERCs, which ensure independent and objective criteria for tariff determination, based on adequate recovery of expense, subject to the distribution licensee achieving the requisite performance benchmark. CRISIL Ratings views this process of tariff setting positively as it is free of external discretions.

Reform legislations also stipulate that each licensee file annual revenue requirements with an option to file a separate tariff petition, in case a tariff revision is warranted. Although regulations provide for most costs to be passed through, along with reasonable returns on equity, SERCs may impose stricter performance standards or disallow certain cost components stemming from inefficiencies of distribution licensees. SERCs thus essentially balance customer interests with what is legitimately due to the distribution licensee.

If information used to support the distribution licensees' rationale for tariff revision is insufficient or under doubt, SERCs have been known to take a tough stance in not allowing the tariff revisions sought by the licensees. Nature and scope of tariff orders already passed by an SERC are a useful index of its regulatory stance.

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2 Updated: February 2021: For accessing the previous published criteria, please refer to https://www.crisil.com/content/dam/crisil/criteria_methodology/utilities/archive/CRISIL-Ratings-criteria-power-distribution-utilities_feb2018.pdf
Timely and accurate filing of tariff petitions by discoms is critical. Failing this, discoms would report losses as tariffs are not retrospective. Also, electricity is politically sensitive and SERCs may defer tariff hikes (at times over multiple years).

**Market position and service area economics**

**Distribution infrastructure**

Availability of widespread distribution infrastructure and retail reach of such infrastructure are key discriminators of a licensee's market position. Distribution licensees have traditionally operated in exclusive zones though legislation now permits non-exclusive licensees to operate in the same area. Although the mix of customers—residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural—within a service area and their purchasing power are key considerations, service quality and reliability offered by a distribution licensee are also important determinants of sustainability of the business relationship. While the market may be willing to offer a price premium for a more responsive and reliable licensee, the latter has to maintain this value proposition for the premium to be sustainable.

**Customer segment**

Growth of a lower-paying customer segment and shifts in better-paying customer segments are trends that would be appropriately factored in. A service area with a larger base of industrial customers registering good growth rates is seen as a positive, as long as such customer concentration is within acceptable limits. Existence of a depreciated distribution infrastructure within a densely populated urban service area is a key entry barrier and could work to the benefit of incumbent licensees.

**Operating efficiency parameters and track record**

**Collection mechanisms, billing systems and other processes**

Given their direct customer interface, distribution licensees have to develop necessary processes, credit guidelines, billing systems and collection mechanisms to ensure that the business is run efficiently. Operating efficiency will ultimately impact the metering, billing and collection cycle, which could affect cash flow.

**Cost of power**

The actual cost of power (whether generated or purchased externally) within a given tariff structure could be the most significant determinant of profitability. Therefore, ability to procure sufficient quantum of power at minimum prices is a critical rating determinant for a distribution licensee. This assumes greater significance in the open access regime where a customer can choose to buy power from different sources. A distribution licensee with a high power procurement cost would risk losing its customers to more efficient players.

**Long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs)**

CRISIL Ratings views long-term PPAs with an efficient generating entity as a positive. Absence of a PPA can constrain ability to ensure uninterrupted supply of power to customers, which can adversely affect business prospects.
Transmission and distribution (T&D) and commercial losses

T&D losses within the service area are either technical or commercial. Industry benchmarks are available for permissible technical losses at lower voltages. Such benchmarks are a function of voltage stability and reflect the efforts to minimise distribution transformer losses through regular maintenance. Commercial losses, on the other hand, include leakage of revenue due to non-paying customers or outright theft. Consistent efforts are required to track energy flow to ensure that all the energy input into the T&D system is being billed after accounting for system losses.

The power tariff advised by the regulator assumes specific improvement in performance indicators and ability to achieve the same is critical for profitability. Besides T&D and commercial losses, manpower productivity parameters and other administrative expenses will also need to be closely tracked and assessed in relation to regulatory forbearance on these expense levels.
Rating criteria for power transmission projects

Background

Power transmission infrastructure helps transfer electricity from generating plants to substations located close to consumers. In India, there is a disparity in access to power among regions because of bottlenecks at two levels. First, poor integration of regional grids leads to an asynchronous national grid, preventing efficient transfer of electricity from surplus to deficit regions. Second, poor last-mile connectivity spawns areas of darkness in power-surplus regions.

To overcome these limitations, the central government has been encouraging private sector participation in the transmission space by granting licences based on competitive bidding. Typically, transmission licensees are special purpose vehicles (SPVs) set up to construct, maintain and operate transmission networks. The SPVs have definitive transmission service agreements (TSAs) with designated transmission system customers. The TSA terms are governed by the CERC, which guarantees tariff-based payment, depending on line availability.

Till their projects begin commercial operations, SPVs face significant risks related to land acquisition and clearances. Once operational, they can expect stable cash flow, backed by pre-determined tariff, assured demand and long tenure of contracts. As long as the SPVs maintain minimum line availability, cash inflow is assured. Cash outflow depends on O&M cost, breakdowns due to topographical conditions, and costs incurred for replacement of transmission assets such as insulators and transmission switches. As cash flow is predictable, these SPVs can operate with low DSCR, unlike toll road and renewable projects (wind and solar), which require a higher DSCR as they face unpredictable demand and variability in PLFs, respectively.

While the quantum of cash flow is predictable, its timing is not. That's because of counterparty payment risk arising from exposure to state discoms, which may not have a uniform payment track record. Risks vary depending on whether the SPV is interstate or intrastate.

In interstate transmission projects, the counterparty risk is largely mitigated through the point of connection (PoC) mechanism, under which, transmission charges are pooled and distributed among licensees in proportion to their annual transmission charges. Involvement of a central transmission utility (CTU) in billing, collection and disbursement of transmission charges among licensees further reduces risk. Currently, Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd (PGCIL) plays the role of CTU.

In intrastate SPVs, state transmission utilities (STUs) are responsible for development of the transmission system. Here, discoms make the payment to the STU, which pays the SPV. In the absence of a pooling mechanism, the SPV faces higher risk of delay in payment by the counterparty due to exposure to a single STU which is dependent on the state discom for cash flow. CRISIL Ratings evaluates the counterparty payment delay risk depending on the presence or absence of a pooling mechanism.

CRISIL Ratings believes transmission projects can mitigate counterparty payment risks by maintaining adequate DSCR and liquidity buffer. For SPVs with similar counterparty payment risk profiles, those with more liquidity buffer will be rated higher.

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3 Updated: October 2019: For accessing the previous published criteria, please refer to https://crisil.com/content/dam/crisil/criteria_methodology/energy/archive/Criteria-for-Rating-power-transmission-projects.pdf
This criteria document focuses on risks faced by power transmission projects and the methodology followed by CRISIL Ratings for assessing their credit quality. The criteria is applicable to SPVs executing a single project. In the electricity ecosystem in Chart 1, the position of transmission licensees (SPVs) for which the criteria is applicable is highlighted in red.

Chart 1: Electricity ecosystem

Flow of electricity

Activity

Generation ➔ Transmission ➔ Exchanges ➔ Discom ➔ End Consumer

Stakeholders

CERC/ SERC - Regulatory Authority for power sector

- Renewables
- Non-Renewables
- Equipment suppliers

CTU/ STU plans an efficient coordinated environmental - friendly grid

Execution By private players, PPP, or public entities

- Indian Energy Exchange (IEX)
- Power Exchange of India (PXI)
- National Power Exchange (NPX)

State Electricity Board Private players

- Industrial Consumer
- Retail Consumer
- Agricultural Consumer

Flow of Funds
Methodology

Chart 2: Framework for rating power transmission projects

1. Project risk

For transmission projects under implementation and yet to become operational, the rating factors project risk (see Table 1).

Table 1: Factors for assessing project risk

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<th>Key project risks</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation risk</td>
<td>Issues related to land acquisition and environmental clearances, and delays in awarding contracts may hamper timely implementation. Terrain complexity enhances risk. While segments passing through plain terrain are easy to execute, those near hills, forests or rivers are more complex.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding risk</td>
<td>Availability of funding—both debt and equity—is critical for timely completion of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology risk</td>
<td>Technology associated with transmission networks is proven and involves standard electrical equipment, reducing risk of disruptions and need for maintenance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Demand and pricing risk    | Power transmission is a natural monopoly, as duplication of transmission lines is highly unlikely. Hence, demand risk is negligible. Pricing risk is negligible as tariff is based on competitive bidding and approved by the CERC. These contracts are of long duration (typically 25
Key project risks | Explanation
--- | ---
 | Long-term transmission customers (LTTCs) pay SPVs in proportion to the allocated capacity.

CRISIL Ratings also factors in the track record of sponsors with regard to timely project completion and the post-implementation debt-servicing ability and liquidity of projects. However, as power projects span long distances, cost overruns and delays are common. Hence, ratings may be lower during the project implementation stage.

Post construction, transmission assets do face some teething issues in maintaining line availability above the normative levels and receiving payments from counterparties on time. It is only when operations have stabilised that the operational metrics may be tested for base-case assumptions. This stabilisation phase can be as long as 18 months depending on the counterparty payment behaviour. SPVs with PoC mechanism take lesser time to stabilise.

**Operating efficiency**

Given the long-term nature of TSAs, transmission SPVs face limited demand risk. Tariff is determined through competitive bidding and is unlikely to change once approved by the CERC, ensuring healthy revenue visibility. However, cash inflow and outflow could vary depending on performance risk resulting from variations in line availability and O&M cost, and natural factors.

In its analysis of operating efficiency of transmission projects, CRISIL Ratings considers factors that may impact cash flow, including the SPV’s ability to maintain line availability higher than that specified in the TSA. As transmission assets are long-lasting, most of the expenses tend to be related to O&M. CRISIL Ratings evaluates the SPV’s ability to cover expected expenses and plan for unexpected circumstances (such as breakdown due to topographical conditions) so as to sustain debt-servicing ability.

A. **Performance risk:** Decline in line availability below the upper threshold (say 98%) reduces transmission charges. There is an additional penalty if line availability drops below the lower threshold (say 95%). Incentives are offered if line availability is maintained above the upper threshold, which result in higher cash inflow. Analysis by CRISIL Ratings indicates that most operational transmission assets have a strong track record of maintaining line availability of 99% and higher. Decline in line availability tends to be temporary and is soon restored. However, as cash flow depends on overall line availability, CRISIL Ratings considers the track record of transmission projects in maintaining higher-than-normative line availability as a key input in its credit risk assessment.

B. **O&M expenses:** Though O&M expenses do not constitute a substantial portion of cash outflow, periodic maintenance is crucial to avoid issues related to tripping of transmission lines, which impacts overall line availability. CRISIL Ratings evaluates the nature of the O&M contract, and adequacy of electrical components and technically qualified manpower for upkeep of transmission networks. Projects which are likely to absorb escalation in O&M expenses without any adverse impact on their debt-servicing ability will have a higher rating.

C. **Geographical risks and contingency plan:** Transmission assets have a long life of 30-35 years, which usually exceeds the loan tenure. While breakdowns are rare, assets in geographies prone to extreme weather conditions are more susceptible to this risk. For example, abnormal wind conditions or cyclones may damage transmission towers, or frequent lightning may cause line tripping and lead to wear-and-tear of insulators and other hardware fittings. Hence, geographical and topographical conditions are critical parameters factored into the risk assessment. Moreover, the management’s contingency plan to restore line availability fast becomes critical.
Hence, measures such as the availability of back-up transformers, provisions for replacement of insulators and other hardware fittings, and adequate insurance cover, are critically evaluated.

2. Counterparty risk

This risk arises in case of delay or non-payment of dues to SPVs. Non-payment of dues is not a major risk as discoms have limited alternatives in terms of transmission infrastructure, and because transmission, unlike generation, constitutes a small proportion of their payables. However, there is uncertainty whether discoms will pay on the due date. More-than-anticipated delay in payments can impair the ability of transmission SPVs to service debt on time. The timeliness of payment depends on the financial health of discoms and the type of collection mechanism adopted by SPVs (PoC or non-PoC).

PoC mechanism: Interstate transmission projects

Under the PoC mechanism, which is typical in interstate projects, an inter-state transmission system (ISTS) licensee does not have direct exposure to a single discom. Rather, multiple ISTS licensees pool collections as per their respective tariffs. The CTU (typically PGCIL) is the collection agency responsible for billing, collecting and distributing transmission charges. Each ISTS licensee will inform PGCIL of the amount due on its lines, while the designated customer will issue a statement on the extent of power drawn. The details are submitted to the national load dispatch centre, which fixes the rate per megawatt (MW) for that quarter, based on which, PGCIL issues bills for the quarter. On receipt of payment from customers, it is disbursed to each licensee based on the disbursement ratio for that quarter.

Any shortfall on account of delay in payment by a discom is borne collectively by the ISTS licensees in proportion to their share in the pool. For example, in the figure below, ISTS licensees, including PGCIL, collectively owe Rs 100 (Rs 25 each). Let us assume a scenario where the CTU collects Rs 90 within the due date. In this scenario, each licensee will receive Rs 22.5, that is a shortfall of Rs 2.5 for each licensee. In contrast, if the delay in payment of Rs 10 was on account of discom 3 delaying its dues to SPV 2, in the absence of the pooling mechanism, SPV 2 would have borne the entire impact of Rs 10 instead of the four SPVs bearing the impact of Rs 2.5 each.

Hence, the PoC mechanism leads to more collection efficiency for ISTS licensees than what the individual entities would have in the absence of such a mechanism. Additionally, stringent regulations related to non-payment of transmission charges have led to significant improvement in collection efficiency, as indicated by the strong track record of PGCIL, which had stable collection of around 99% over the past few years.
Hence, counterparty payment risks are lower for interstate projects that collect payments through a pooling mechanism.

**Intrastate transmission projects: Exposure to a single transmission utility**

In intrastate transmission projects, the counterparty is an STU, which depends on state discoms for cash flow. Hence, there is no diversification benefit and bargaining power available to PoC pools. In such a scenario, CRISIL Ratings evaluates the track record of the STU’s payments to SPVs, and whether it is at significant variance with payments by discoms to transmission utilities. CRISIL Ratings also assesses state discoms based on their payment track record and ranks them under different payment risk categories.

CRISIL Ratings believes maintenance of adequate liquidity by SPVs, in the form of DSRA and other cash equivalent, is critical to mitigate counterparty payment risk. The greater the delay in payment by counterparties, the more liquidity the transmission licensee will need to maintain to lessen counterparty payment risks.

**3. Financial risk**

A DSCR-based cash flow approach is used to evaluate the financial strength of SPVs. This methodology takes into account line availability, operating expenses, asset replacement charges, and interest and principal obligations during the tenure of the debt. CRISIL Ratings also analyses liquidity maintained by SPVs in the form of DSRA to withstand any counterparty payment delay.

CRISIL Ratings uses combinations of DSCR and DSRA for different rating categories. For instance, for an SPV with DSCR of 1.05, counterparty in ‘Payment risk category 1’, and project-level DSRA of three months, the standalone rating may map to ‘CRISIL A’. Transmission projects can operate with thin DSCR because of the predictability of their cash flow. This is in contrast to toll road and renewable (wind and solar) power projects. Toll projects have uncertain cash flow due to demand and price risk, as traffic volume is unpredictable and toll rates are subject to revision. For renewable power projects, seasonal PLFs lead to uncertain output. Hence, these projects need higher DSCR.

**Conclusion**

For rating transmission projects, CRISIL Ratings focuses on adequacy and stability of cash flow for servicing debt, and liquidity required to mitigate counterparty payment risks.

CRISIL Ratings also evaluates qualitative factors to arrive at the standalone rating of transmission SPVs, and may factor in parent/group support or external credit enhancements through guarantees (partial or full). Criteria for factoring in parent/group support and for evaluating partial guarantee instruments are covered under other articles on CRISIL’s website.
Rating criteria for solar power projects

Background

Solar power is emerging as a major segment in the renewable energy space because of the push from the government and the rapid decline in capital cost. Solar power projects depend on solar radiation, also called insolation, to generate electricity, and face lower fuel availability risk than conventional sources of power.

Solar power projects face risks such as variation in radiation levels, new technology, solar panel quality, and counterparty payment risk. While vulnerable to climatic changes, the inter-annual variability in solar radiation, unlike wind speed, is relatively low. There are significant technology risks involved in solar power projects because, barring some exceptions such as crystalline silicon, the technology is new, evolving rapidly, and often owned by companies with moderate-to-weak credit quality.

Counterparty payment risk pertains to the risk of delays in payment by state power discoms. CRISIL Ratings believes solar power projects can mitigate this risk by maintaining adequate DSCR and liquidity buffer.

In its analysis of solar power projects, CRISIL Ratings takes into account all the risks that impact their credit quality and the risk-mitigating initiatives adopted by the sponsors. The analysis also factors in the risk related to renewal of PPA and considers the benefits of portfolio diversity.

This criteria document covers the risks that solar power projects face, and the rating methodology CRISIL Ratings follows for assessing their credit quality.

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4 Updated: February 2019; For accessing the previous published criteria, please refer to https://www.crisil.com/content/dam/crisil/criteria_methodology/energy/Criteria_for_rating_solar_power_projects.pdf
Methodology

The CRISIL Ratings framework for assessing a solar power project is indicated in Chart 1. This methodology is similar to any other project finance assessment.

Chart 1: Framework for rating solar projects

- Project risk
  - Implementation risk
  - Funding risk
  - Offtaker and pricing risk
- Technology risk
- Panel quality risk
- Management risk
  - Integrity
  - Risk appetite
  - Competency
- Operational risk
  - Performance-DSCR
  - Counterparty payment risk
  - Liquidity-internal
  - Competency
- Standalone credit profile
- Parent/group notch-up
- External credit enhancement
- Final rating

**Project risk**

For solar power projects under implementation and yet to enter the operational phase, project risk (see Table 1) plays a key role in arriving at the standalone credit rating.

**Table 1: Factors to assess project risk**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key project risks</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementation risk</td>
<td>Solar power projects face fewer implementation risks. However, issues related to land availability and power evacuation because of delays in commissioning of transmission lines could be a major hindrance to timely completion of projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding risk</td>
<td>Availability of funding, both debt and equity, is critical for timely completion of the project.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Offtake and pricing risk

PPA with a distribution company or captive power consumers reduces the market risk once the solar power project is commissioned.

Solar power projects are relatively less challenging to set up than thermal power plants and have an established track record of timely completion. That said, the projects face risks related to land availability and evacuation infrastructure which play a key role in determining debt servicing ability. Nevertheless, these risks are usually lower for projects set up in solar parks and this is factored in the credit rating.

Solar power projects face stabilisation risks after construction is complete. It is only when the operations have stabilised that the operational metrics may be tested for base-case assumptions. The stabilisation phase may vary from one to two years.

Management risk

CRISIL Ratings evaluates the management in three broad categories: integrity, risk appetite and competency. For details, please refer to CRISIL Ratings article, ‘Rating criteria for manufacturing companies’ available on www.crisil.com.

Operational risk

Operational solar power projects primarily face generation and counterparty payment risks, which can be mitigated through adequate liquidity and DSCR.

Chart 2: Framework for capturing operational risk

A. Power generation risk (DSCR)
B. Counterparty payment risk
C. Liquidity at SPV level

a. Power generation risk:

A solar power project SPV will depend on cash flow generated by the asset for servicing debt. The cash flow will depend on electricity generated, which is vulnerable to inter- or intra-annual variability in solar radiation.
**Inter-annual variation:** Solar radiation may vary from year to year, though not as significantly as wind speed (variations are less than half of that in wind speed\(^5\)). CRISIL Ratings believes the inter-annual variation risk can be largely mitigated by projecting power generation at a PLF of P90 in the base case to arrive at the appropriate DSCR and rating.

**Annual seasonality:** Solar radiation is seasonal, peaking in summer and declining in monsoon. However, the seasonality, at least in Indian conditions, is typically less than half of that for wind. The lean season for solar power typically is of 3-4 months compared with 6-7 months for wind. *(See section, 'How does seasonality risk differ between solar and wind projects?').* CRISIL Ratings believes solar power SPVs may mitigate the impact of variability in power generation by maintaining liquidity buffer or by retaining surplus cash generated during the peak season to cover the deficit in the lean season.

**b. Technology risk:**

Technology risk is an important credit rating factor for solar PV projects because the technology is still evolving. Different technologies have varying track record of efficiency and degradation. *(See box, 'What is degradation in solar panels?')*

Crystalline silicon technology has a long and established track record in capturing solar radiation. It has been operational for some time and deployed in several utility-scale projects globally. Thin-film technologies (CIGS, CdTe, and amorphous) do not have such a proven track record. The quality of thin-films and the production process varies among manufacturers. Hence, for thin-film technologies, the reputation of the vendor and the credibility of the technology and manufacturing process will play a critical role in determining technology risk. Unproven technologies with moderate reputation and limited track record face more risks such as steep degradation and dramatic equipment failure. These risks are factored in while arriving at the credit rating.

**c. Panel quality risk:**

The quality of solar panels varies among manufacturers. Even for the same manufacturer, the quality may vary significantly across specifications. For instance, a reputed solar manufacturer may have 30 products across 20 price points. Solar project developers will try to optimise between quality, price, and panel-supplier reputation because of pricing pressure spawned by competitive bidding.

CRISIL Ratings analysies the factors given below to assess equipment quality risk. Management interaction and reports by third-party consultants (part of the project report) will play a key role in the assessment of these factors. The project rating may be constrained because of concerns regarding panel quality. But this could be offset if satisfactory empirical evidence proves that the panel quality is not detrimental to performance.

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**What is degradation in solar panels?**

Solar panels convert solar radiation into electrical energy. The ability to do so declines steadily and irreversibly over time. The degradation may be in a cell or parts of a module or both. The ability to accurately predict power delivery over time is vital to assess the credit risk profile of a project. The thumb rule in the industry is 0.75%\(^5\)

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\(^5\) [https://www.crisil.com/content/dam/crisil/criteria_methodology/energy/V3-Wind-power-criteria-July-8.pdf](https://www.crisil.com/content/dam/crisil/criteria_methodology/energy/V3-Wind-power-criteria-July-8.pdf)
system degradation per annum. That translates into 10% degradation over 10 years and 20% over 25 years. Anything higher is considered a risk to cash generating ability and, by extension, to debt servicing ability. Degradation depends on many factors such as technology, panel quality and maintenance.

**How does seasonality risk differ between solar and wind projects?**

The table below highlights energy generated by typical solar and wind projects operating in India. In wind projects, nearly 60% of the energy is generated in just four months, while in solar projects, the generation is more spread out—close to 55% in six months. Hence, for a solar power project, liquidity required to mitigate the seasonality risk is much lower.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>Solar</th>
<th>Wind</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. **Reputation of the module supplier:** The reputation of the module supplier depends on track record, bankability, scale of orders executed, order backlog and technological capability. The landscape of solar panel suppliers is constantly changing with new companies setting up shop and several exiting due to weak credit risk profile. Financial distress at the time of supplying panels to a rated solar power project may result in the supplier compromising on quality, leading to low quality of the project. In addition, it is the manufacturer’s credit quality that backs the warranties on panels.

ii. **Design quality:** Design quality is driven by the type and combination of materials used to build the module. Because of pricing pressure, panel makers may buy cheaper cells and assemble them into panels. The quality of other components such as glass, back-sheet, module junction box, and cable connectors could also be compromised. International standards governed by IEC indicate a minimum threshold to predict reliability.
iii. **Manufacturing quality:** Manufacturing quality is driven by the process followed. This can vary from factory to factory, especially in a scenario when many panel manufacturers outsource production of modules. Hence, it is important for a project developer to look closely at the materials and control quality during production by keeping a tab on the process, from raw material supply to the finished module.

iv. **EPC quality:** Although construction complexity for solar projects is much lower than that for thermal projects, the quality of construction may vary significantly from one EPC player to another. Hence, the reputation, track record, industry expertise, and bankability of the EPC contractor are critical when assessing the quality of a project.

v. **Warranty and insurance:** Manufacturers of solar panels extend warranties of 20 years or more. This provides business certainty and assures project developers performance up to 90% for 10 years and 80% for another 15 years. If panels degrade more and affect project cash flow, the manufacturer will fulfil the warranty by supplying additional panels that will enable achievement of the performance originally warranted. However, if a manufacturer has shut shop, the warranty is of limited use. To overcome the credit risk in warranty, suppliers back their warranties with third-party insurance. It is critical to understand the nature of such insurance and the extent to which they compensate any material failure in performance warranted by the panel manufacturer. Modules from other equipment suppliers can be made compatible after minor engineering modifications, which, however, may come at a cost. Like panel suppliers, EPC players also provide performance guarantee for two years and workmanship guarantee for five years.

d. **Counterparty risk:**

Solar power projects usually have PPAs with discoms or captive consumers. While PPAs tend to reduce the demand risk, operational solar power projects continue to face counterparty payment risk. Even if the SPV generates adequate power and supplies to a buyer, any delay in payment by the buyer can significantly impact the SPV’s credit quality. Payment risk varies from buyer to buyer.

The payment risk is not the same as the counterparty’s credit quality. Often, state discoms with weak credit risk profiles continue to make payments to power generation companies, albeit with delays. That’s because discoms may get support from the respective state government. Some discoms have a better payment track record for their purchases of renewable power.

CRISIL Ratings has assessed state discoms based on their payment behaviour over the past few years along with other factors (see Table 2) and classified them into payment risk categories 1 to 6.

**Table 2: Approach to assess the payment risk category**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
<th>Aspects analysed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business profile</strong></td>
<td>Track record of recent increases in tariff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aggregate technical and commercial losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Profit gap (in rupees per unit on subsidy booked basis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial profile</strong></td>
<td>Networth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Losses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e. Liquidity at the SPV level

CRISIL Ratings believes maintaining adequate liquidity at the SPV level is critical to mitigate counterparty payment risk and seasonality. The more the delay from counterparties, the higher will be the liquidity that the SPV needs to maintain to mitigate counterparty payment risk. Also, seasonal deficit in a typical project is about two months of debt obligation.

CRISIL Ratings factors in variation in solar radiation and payment risk appropriately. The rating depends on the DSCR and liquidity maintained by the SPV. The liquidity requirement varies with counterparty risk and the extent of seasonality. Given the sector's inherent risks, and the economic considerations where the developer may want to generate reasonable returns on investment, project DSCR and liquidity are unlikely to be substantially high.

Modifiers

There are other project-specific modifiers that may also impact the SPV’s credit quality.

i. PLF track record: CRISIL Ratings considers a P90 PLF for projects to arrive at the DSCR. Thus, it is expected that the average annual PLF will be greater than the P90 PLF in 9 out of 10 years. However, if the project has a PLF track record that is much weaker—for instance, if output has been at a sub-P90 level for 2-3 years—it could indicate either faster degradation or less-than-expected solar radiation. This will constrain the cash generating ability, and thereby, the rating of the solar power project. On the other hand, if the PLF in the first few years is materially higher than the P90 level—for instance, between P50 and P75—it is still consistent with the expected power curve. If a new study indicates that the new P90 PLF is higher than the one assumed earlier, CRISIL Ratings will use the new P90 PLF in its assessment.

Why use P90 PLF levels to calculate DSCR?

Please refer to the Annexure to understand why P90 PLF levels are used to calculate DSCR

ii. Payment track record: CRISIL Ratings has categorised counterparty payment risk based on which a base-case assumption of likely payment delay is made. However, if the observed payment pattern for specific solar projects is materially different from the base case assumption for a substantial period of time, this will be taken into account while arriving at the rating.

iii. Liquidity at the parent level: The liquidity requirement for mitigating the seasonality and payment risks should be available at a project level. However, if the SPV’s parent has a policy of maintaining liquidity buffer on its balance sheet for addressing cash flow mismatches of the SPVs it has sponsored, CRISIL Ratings takes this into account when rating the SPV.

iv. Portfolio diversification: CRISIL Ratings views portfolio diversification through geographical and counterparty diversification positively. Solar farms spread across locations and supplying to different counterparties tend to
reduce the impact of risks related to resource variation and counterparty payment. CRISIL Ratings notches up the rating of an SPV if it has greater stability in cash flow on account of portfolio diversification.

v. **PPA tenure and renewal risk:** If the PPA tenure is less than the debt tenure, the SPV will face pricing risk. The lesser the tenure of the PPA compared with the debt tenure, the greater will be the risk.

Also, if the PPA is priced close to or lower than the prevailing market rate, renewal risk is low. On the other hand, if the current tariff considerably exceeds the prevailing market rate, the project will face renewal risk once the PPA expires. Also, the liability structure could be such that the entire principal is not amortised over the tenure of the debt, leading to a large bullet payment at the end of the tenure. This exposes the project to refinancing risk. CRISIL Ratings will assess these aspects and adequately factor in the risk when arriving at the rating of the solar power project.

The above methodology, which includes assessment of project risk, management risk and operational risk along with other modifiers impacting the credit quality of the solar power project, is used to arrive at the standalone rating of the SPV. CRISIL Ratings may also consider parent/group support or any other external credit enhancement mechanism to arrive at the final rating on debt instruments of the SPV.

**Conclusion**

The CRISIL Ratings methodology for rating solar power projects involves extensive analysis of all the pertinent risk factors. The analysis focuses on the adequacy and stability of cash flow for debt servicing, and considers the risk mitigation initiatives the SPV has set in place for factors that impact cash flow adequacy and stability. In addition, CRISIL Ratings may factor in parent/group support or external credit enhancement in the form of guarantees (partial or full) when assigning credit ratings. The criteria for parent/group support and for evaluating partial guarantee instruments are covered under other articles on the CRISIL website.
Rating criteria for rating wind power projects\(^6\)

**Background**

India is expected to install 175 gigawatt (GW) of renewable energy generation plants, including 60 GW\(^7\) of wind power, by 2020. The country is halfway there on wind power, with 34 GW\(^8\) of wind power capacities installed as on May 31, 2018. The capacity expansion will continue to be supported by recent positive developments in the sector. Upgrades in technology—machines with higher hub heights and rotor blades of larger diameter, for instance—are expected to enhance PLF and cash generation for producers. In addition, power producers backed by private equity players are exploring the viability of structures such as obligor-co-obligor to strengthen their credit risk profiles.

Wind power projects depend on wind speed for generating electricity, and therefore, have lower fuel availability risks than other conventional sources of power generation. Moreover, wind power technology has established itself in the renewable energy space, given its track record of more than three decades in operations and predictability regarding performance and lifecycle maintenance.

However, wind power projects face some unique risks, the key ones being wind variability and counterparty payment risks. As wind power primarily depends on wind speeds, it is exposed to the vagaries of nature. Wind speeds may vary from year to year and even within a year. The counterparty payment risks pertain to delays in payments by the state power discoms. CRISIL Ratings, however, believes that wind power projects can mitigate these risks by maintaining adequate DSCR and liquidity buffer. In its analysis of wind power projects, CRISIL Ratings considers all the risks that impact their credit quality and the risk-mitigating initiatives adopted by their sponsors. The analysis also factor in the benefits of portfolio diversity and risks relating to renewal of PPA.

This criteria document explains the methodology of CRISIL Ratings for assessing the credit profiles of wind power producers and discusses the risks faced by wind power projects.

**Methodology**

The CRISIL Ratings framework for assessing the rating of a wind power project is indicated in Chart 1. This methodology is similar to any other project finance assessment.

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\(^6\) Updated: June 2018; For accessing the previous published criteria, please refer to [https://crisil.com/content/dam/crisil/criteria_methodology/energy/archive/V3-Wind-power-criteria-July-8.pdf](https://crisil.com/content/dam/crisil/criteria_methodology/energy/archive/V3-Wind-power-criteria-July-8.pdf)

\(^7\) India’s intended nationally determined contribution report submitted at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

\(^8\) Programme/Scheme wise Physical Progress in 2018-19 & Cumulative up to May, 2018, by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy
1. Project risk

For wind power projects that are under implementation and yet to enter the operational phase, the rating takes into account project risks (see Table 1):

Table 1: Factors for assessing project risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key project risks</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementation risk</td>
<td>Design and construction risks in wind power projects are negligible. Wind power projects have a proven track record of timely execution across several installations. However, land availability and power evacuation issues due to delays in commissioning transmission lines could pose a major challenge for timely completion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding risk</td>
<td>Availability of funding—both debt and equity—is critical for timely completion of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology risk</td>
<td>Technology used for onshore windfarms such as the turbine and gear boxes is proven.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offtake and pricing risk</td>
<td>PPAs with discoms or captive power consumers reduce market risk once the wind project is commissioned.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wind power projects are relatively less challenging to implement than thermal power plants. Wind power projects have a track record of timely completion. Hence, during implementation, wind power projects may have a rating of ‘BBB-’, provided the sponsor has a track record of timely completion of projects and subject to the assessment by
CRISIL Ratings of the project’s post-implementation debt-servicing ability and liquidity. However, due to risks associated with implementation and stabilisation of projects, it is likely that the rating will be no higher than ‘BBB-’ for projects in the implementation or stabilisation phase.

Wind power projects face stabilisation risks on completion of construction. It is only when the operations have stabilised that the operational metrics may be tested for base-case assumptions. The stabilisation phase may vary from one year to a maximum of two years. Since the stabilisation phase may throw up surprises in terms of PLF and payment track record, the rating is unlikely to be higher than ‘BBB-’.

2. Management risk

CRISIL Ratings evaluates the management in three categories: integrity, risk appetite and competency. For details, refer to ‘Rating criteria for manufacturing companies’ available on www.crisil.com.

3. Operational risk

Operational wind projects primarily face risks pertaining to power generation and counterparty payment. The risks may be mitigated by maintaining adequate liquidity and a sufficient DSCR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart 2: Framework for capturing operational risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Counterparty payment risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Power generation risk (DSCR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Liquidity at SPV Level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a) Power generation risk

Wind power SPVs depend largely on cash flow generated by the asset for debt servicing. The project cash flow will, in turn, depend on the power generated by the wind farm, and therefore, on the wind speed. The wind speed may vary from year to year and within a year.

1. **Inter-annual variations**: The inter-annual wind speed and therefore the power generated follow a normal distribution pattern. Inter-annual variation risk may be largely mitigated by projecting power generation at a PLF of P90 in the base case to arrive at the appropriate DSCR and rating (refer to Box, ‘Why use P90 PLF to calculate DSCR?’)

2. **Annual seasonality**: Typically, the peak wind season is of 3-5 months while the lean season is for the rest of the year. The peak season generates around two-thirds of the annual production. Thus, in the
lean season, the project PLF and revenue generation will be much lower than the annual average. SPVs may, however, mitigate the impact of variability in power generated by maintaining liquidity buffers or retaining surplus cash generated during the peak season for making up for the deficit in the lean season.

b) Counterparty risk

Wind power projects also face risks relating to delayed payments from customers. They usually have PPAs with discoms or captive power consumers. However, while the PPAs tend to reduce demand risks for operational wind power projects, the projects continue to face counterparty payment risks. Even if the SPV generates and supplies adequate power, delay in payments by the buyer can significantly impact the SPV’s credit quality. Payment risks vary from buyer to buyer.

The payment risk is, however, not the same as the counterparty's credit quality. Often, state discoms with weak credit risk profiles continue to make payments to the power generation companies, albeit with delays. This is because the state discoms get support from the state government. Some state discoms also maintain better payment track records on their renewable power purchases than on thermal power.

The primary risk for operational wind mills is delay in payments by the discoms. CRISIL Ratings has assessed the state discoms based on their payment behaviour in recent years and other factors (see Table 2) and classified them in six payment risk categories – payment risk category 1 to 6.

Table 2: Approach to assess the discoms’ payment risk category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk factor</th>
<th>Aspects analysed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business profile</td>
<td>• Track record of recent tariff hikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Aggregate technical and commercial losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Profit gap (in rupees per unit on subsidy booked basis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial profile</td>
<td>• Networth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State government ability to support</td>
<td>• Release of subsidy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• State government rating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment track record</td>
<td>• Payment track record over last few years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c) Liquidity at the SPV level

Adequate liquidity at the SPV level is crucial to mitigate counterparty payment risks and seasonality in wind speeds. The greater the delay from counterparties, the higher will be the liquidity the SPV needs to maintain to mitigate counterparty payment risks. Also, annual seasonality deficit in a typical project is 4-5 months of debt servicing (refer to box titled, ‘Assessing annual seasonality.’)

CRISIL Ratings factors in the wind variability and payment risks appropriately. The rating will vary based on the DSCR and liquidity buffer maintained by the SPV. The liquidity requirement varies with the counterparty risk and the extent of seasonality in the project. Given the inherent risks in the sector and the economic considerations where the developer may want to generate reasonable returns on the investment, the project DSCR and liquidity are unlikely to be substantially high.
Assessing annual seasonality

The following table gives the pattern of PLF generated by a wind power project of 1 MW in a typical year. The project cost is assumed to be Rs 6 crore, funded in a debt-to-equity ratio of 3:1. We have assumed a P90 annual PLF of 20%, the tariff at Rs 5 per unit along with debt tenure of 12 years at an interest rate of 11% per annum serviced through an equated monthly installment (EMI) for the sample calculation.

The power generated in the peak season (months 1 to 4) is about 70% and that in the lean season (months 5 to 12) is about 30% of the annual output. It is assumed that the surplus generated in the peak months is not retained in the SPV. Thus, for an equated monthly payment, in the lean months there is a cash flow deficit against the maturing debt. The deficit in a typical wind power project is about four months of debt obligation. In the example given below, the cumulative deficit in the lean months is Rs 22.38 lakh and the maturing debt is Rs 5.6 lakh each month. Thus, the deficit is around 4 months of maturing debt (Rs 22.38/Rs 5.6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>PLF</th>
<th>Units generated (kWh lakh)</th>
<th>Cash flow for debt servicing (Rs lakh)</th>
<th>Total debt servicing(P+I) (Rs lakh)</th>
<th>Monthly surplus/shortfall (Rs lakh)</th>
<th>Cumulative shortfall (Rs lakh)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peak Season</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>14.05</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>18.54</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>19.35</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>13.70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>12.92</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lean Season</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-1.55</td>
<td>-2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-3.16</td>
<td>-5.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-3.56</td>
<td>-9.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-3.96</td>
<td>-13.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-4.28</td>
<td>-17.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-4.76</td>
<td>-22.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This deficit is covered only if liquidity in terms of cash and/or surplus cash flow is retained from the peak season. Operational wind power projects should, therefore, have a base case cash liquidity equivalent to at least four months of maturing debt to fund the deficit during the lean months. However, some projects may have deficits that exceed four months of maturing debt.
4. Modifiers

Other project-specific modifiers may also impact the SPV’s credit quality.

a) **PLF track record**: CRISIL Ratings considers a P90 PLF in determining a project’s DSCR. The average annual PLF may, therefore, be expected to exceed the P90 PLF in 9 years out of 10. However, if the project’s PLF track record is much weaker—for instance, if its output has been at a sub-P90 level for two to three years—this could indicate that the power curve has possibly shifted and will constrain the rating of the wind power project. On the other hand, if the PLF in the first few years materially exceeds the P90 levels, and ranges, say, between P50 and P75, this is still consistent with the expected power curve. If a new study indicates that the power curve has shifted and the new P90 PLF is higher than the one assumed earlier, CRISIL Ratings will use the new P90 PLF in its assessment.

b) **Payment track record**: CRISIL Ratings has categorised the payment risk of the counterparty, based on which, a base case assumption of likely payment delay is assumed. However, if the observed payment pattern for the specific wind asset differs materially from the base case assumption for a substantial period of time, this will be taken into account while arriving at the rating.

c) **Liquidity of the parent**: The liquidity required to mitigate the annual seasonality deficit and payment risk is to be maintained by the project. However, if the SPV’s parent has a policy of maintaining liquidity buffer on its balance sheet for addressing any cash flow mismatches of the SPVs it has sponsored, CRISIL Ratings also takes this liquidity buffer into account while assessing the rating of the SPV.

d) **Portfolio diversification**: Portfolio diversification, through geographical and counterparty diversification, helps reduce risk. For wind farms spread across different locations, the farther the locations are from each other, the lesser will be the correlation between their wind speed patterns. Hence, geographical diversification tends to reduce the inter-annual variability (as indicated by standard deviation) of the wind speed. Diversification with regard to counterparties tends to reduce payment risks. CRISIL Ratings notches up the rating of the SPV if it has greater stability in cash flows on account of portfolio diversification.

e) **PPA tenure and renewal risk**: If the PPA tenure is lower than the tenure of the debt, the SPV will be exposed to pricing risk. The lower the tenure of the PPA compared with the debt tenure, the greater will be the risk.

If the PPA is priced close to or lower than the prevailing market rate, the renewal risk is low. On the other hand, if the current tariff considerably exceeds the prevailing market rate, the project will be exposed to renewal risk once the PPA expires. Therefore, the higher the current tariff from the market rate, the greater the project’s risk exposure.

The liability structure could be such that the entire principal is not amortised over the tenure of the debt, leading to a large bullet payment at the end of the tenure. This exposes the project to refinancing risk. CRISIL Ratings will assess these aspects and risks in rating wind power projects.

This methodology of assessing project risk, management risk, and operational risk, along with other modifiers impacting the credit quality of the wind power project, is used to arrive at the standalone rating of the SPV. CRISIL Ratings may also consider parent/group support or any other external credit enhancement mechanisms to arrive at the final rating of the debt instruments of the SPV.

**Conclusion**

For rating wind power projects, CRISIL Ratings analyses all the relevant risk factors. The analysis focuses on the adequacy and stability of cash flows for debt servicing. The rating methodology also takes into account the risk mitigation initiatives the SPV has set in place for factors that impact cash flow adequacy and stability. CRISIL Ratings
may also factor in parent/group support or external credit enhancements in the form of guarantees (partial or full) while assigning ratings to the debt instruments. The criteria for parent/group support and for evaluating partial guarantee instruments are covered under other articles on CRISIL’s website.

**Annexure**

**Why use P90 PLF levels to calculate DSCR?**

The output of solar projects depends on solar radiation, which is an exogenous factor and is variable. The resultant uncertainty is offset by assigning probability to different PLF levels. Based on meteorological and ground-level data, solar radiation at a given site may be assessed, which may be combined with the panel’s power output curve to arrive at the expected average annual PLF, which may be termed as P50.

For wind mills, output is driven by wind speed, which is unpredictable. This uncertainty is countered by assigning probability to each PLF level. Based on historical wind speed data, the average wind speeds at a given site may be assessed. These may be combined with the turbine’s power curve to arrive at the expected average annual PLF, which may be termed as P50.

As can be seen from the following chart, there is equal probability that the PLF in a given year may be higher or lower than P50. On the other hand, P90 is the PLF level that a wind turbine is 90% likely to exceed in a given year.

![Normal Distribution Chart](chart.png)

P90 has 90% area under the curve to the right, indicating that PLF is higher than this value 90% of the time.

In the early years of a solar panel or wind mill’s operations, there may be estimation errors or sharp deviation in actual energy output compared with estimates through studies. In solar, these may crop up because of errors in solar radiation assessment, which is a combination of meteorological satellite data and ground-level data. Furthermore, quality of air due to pollution and suspended air particles can alter solar radiation reaching the panel.
In wind, these may crop up because of errors in calculation of wind speed at incorrect mast heights, sample bias during the study, or faulty estimation of power curves. Furthermore, changing weather patterns due to global warming, and climatic phenomena, such as El Nino, adversely impact wind speeds. Thus, the risk of inter-year wind variability is inherent for wind power projects.

In solar, the standard deviation for PLF estimation is typically 2-3% with a P50 value of 20%. Hence, the variation in PLF in a solar project may not be very high compared with say a wind project where the variation is 4-6%. However, to factor in estimation error and resource variability risk, CRISIL Ratings uses the P90 level of annual PLF when calculating DSCR in both solar and wind power projects. Also, internationally, both solar and wind power estimates are made using P90 PLF.
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